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RICHARD A. BOOTH*
One would think that the existing stockholders of
companies going public would be outraged at the failure
of their investment bankers to do a better job at setting
prices for IPOs, and indeed, there was a spate of litigation
following the dotcom bust. However for the most part,
those who complained were investors who had been
cajoled into buying shares in the aftermarket.
i. INTRODUCTION
It is a well-known anomaly of corporate finance that initial public
offerings ("IPOs") tend to be underpriced.' That is, it appears that shares
tend to be offered at a price that is below what the market would bear. In a
few cases toward the end of the dotcom frenzy, IPO shares rose by as much
as 500 percent during the first day of trading. To be sure, much of that
price pop is often dissipated in the days and weeks that follow. Indeed,
investors who buy newly offered shares in the aftermarket (rather than
receiving an allocation from their broker at the offering price) often end up
with a loss. 3 Nevertheless, on average and over the long haul, IPOs tend to
rise from their offering price by more than other shares of similar risk by
about eighteen percent.4
* Martin G. McGuinn Professor of Business Law, Villanova University School of Law.
1 See Anita Indira Anand, Is the Dutch Auction 1PO a Good Idea?, 11 STAN. J.L. Bus.
& FIN. 233 (2006); Royce de Rohan Barondes et al., 1PO Spreads: You Get What You
Pay For (2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-233146; Sean J. Griffith,
Spinning and Underpricing: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Preferential
Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583 (2004);
Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 711
(2004); Christine Hurt, What Google Can't Tell Us About Internet Auctions (And What
It Can), 37 U. TOL. L. REv. 403 (2006); Peter B. Oh, The Dutch Auction Myth, 42
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 853, 861 (2007); Jonathan A. Shayne & Larry D. Soderquist,
Inefficiency in the Market for Initial Public Qfferings, 448 VAND. L. REV. 965 (1995).
2 The record apparently belongs to VA Linux Systems whose IPO rose 697.50% on
December 9, 1999. See Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot 1PO Breach of
Fiduciary Duty or Business as Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2023 (2002).
3 Shayne & Soderquist, supra note 1, at 970 (finding that IPOs bought at the first day
closing price returned less than seasoned stocks); Terzah Ewing, Burnt Offerings?
Street Debuts Are Fizzling After Pop, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2000, at C1.
4 Oh, supra note 1, at 3.
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One would think that the existing stockholders of companies going
public would be outraged at the failure of their investment bankers to do a
better job at setting prices for IPOs, and indeed, there was a spate of
litigation following the dotcom bust. However for the most part, those who
complained were investors who had been cajoled into buying shares in the
aftermarket. 5 It appears that issuers and existing stockholders are quite
happy when the stock soars following an IPO despite the fact that a big pop
in price would suggest that the company could have sold the shares at a
6higher price and thus been worth that much more. In effect, underpricing
raises the cost of going public and makes equity capital that much more
expensive than it would otherwise be.'
ii. THE UNDERPRICING PROBLEM
What explains the persistence of underpricing in the market for
initial public offerings? There are several unsavory explanations.
First, underpricing reduces risk for underwriters. In a traditional
fixed-price, firm-commitment offering, the underwriter agrees to buy the
shares being offered at a discount of typically seven percent off the offering
price, and then undertakes to resell them to investors at the price specified
in the offering. In other words, the issuer gets the money up front (less the
underwriting discount). If the underwriter cannot resell the shares, the
underwriter loses. 8 Therefore, one explanation for underpricing is that
5 See e.g. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2389 (2007);
In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006).
6 See Hurt, supra note 1, at 6; Oh, supra note 1, at 627-28; Robert McGough & Randall
Smith, IPO Issuers Don't Mind Money Left on the Table, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1999, at
C]; Timothy J.
Mullaney, Is the Street Lowballing 1POs?, Bus. WK., Apr. 3, 2000, at 112. The
litigation following the dotcom bust was prompted primarily by share allocation
practices and has been prosecuted in many cases by creditors who succeeded to
ownership as a result of issuer bankruptcy.
7 See generally NYSE /NASD IPO ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (May 2003),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules regs/documents/rules regs/pO0373.pdf.
8 See Sean J. Griffith, The Puzzling Persistence of the Fixed Price Qffering: Implicit
Price Discrimination in IPOs (2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-797865.
There are other possible models. In a best efforts underwriting, the underwriter attempts
to sell the offered securities but does not buy them up front. Many such offerings are
made on an all or nothing basis. That is, the securities are ultimately sold only if the
underwriter is able to sell the entire offering. In the UK, the traditional arrangement is
for the underwriter to guarantee the offering by agreeing to buy any unsold shares. One
might call such an arrangement a true underwriting. See Coffee, et al., SECURITIES
REGULATION 67 ( 1 0 th ed. 2007) for a description of various possible underwriting
arrangements.
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underwriters set a low price in order to assure that the offering will sell out
quickly-"go out the window" in the argot of Wall Street.9
Second, underpricing reduces litigation risk for underwriters.10
Under the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act"), the underwriter is liable for
damages if there is a misrepresentation or omission of any material fact in
the registration statement or prospectus. 11 But the underwriter is liable only
for the difference between the offering price and the value of the shares
after corrective disclosure or rescission, and practically speaking, only for
one year following the date of the offering. 12  There are relatively few
defenses to a claim under the 1933 Act, so investors are likely to sue
whenever the market price falls below the offering price during the first
year following the offering. After all, one can usually find some sort of
misstatement or omission somewhere in a document the size of a
registration statement or prospectus.1 3 The problem is that stocks rise and
fall for all sorts of reasons. Indeed, almost all stocks tend to rise and fall
with the market, and the market can easily fall by as much as ten or twenty
percent in the space of a year. Moreover, IPO stocks tend to be somewhat
riskier than the market as whole and therefore tend to fall more than the
market as a whole when the market as a whole declines. 14 Thus,
underpricing may be intended to hedge against the possibility of litigation
under the 1933 Act as a result of extraneous market fluctuations. If so, the
problem would seem to be more with the 1933 Act than it is with
underwriters. 15
9 See Oh, supra note 1, at 625.
10 See id. at 628-29.
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006)(providing for damages remedy in
connection with misrepresentation or omission in registration statement); § 771
(providing for rescission in connection with misrepresentation or omission in
prospectus). The issuer is strictly liable under § 77k, but the underwriter and others may
assert a due diligence defense. A similar defense is available under § 771, which applies
to sellers.
12 15 U.S.C. § 77m (providing for one year statute of limitations with three year
repose); § 77k (requiring proof of reliance after issuer has reported earnings for 12
month period following effective date of registration statement).
13 See, e.g., Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.
1989) (dismissing 1933 Act action against issuer electric utility claiming that issuer
should have warned about the possibility of adverse regulatory action).
14 See Richard A. Booth, Windfall Awards Under PSLRA, 59 Bus. LAW. 1043 (2004).
15 That is, underpricing provides protection from the risk of liability because the market
price must fall below the offering price for the underwriter to be exposed to liability.
See Stanford Clearinghouse for data about the minimum/average price decline that
typically triggers a 1933 Act action. Moreover, given that IPOs tend to be concentrated
in up markets, the chance of a downturn would seem to be somewhat enhanced. To be
sure, one might argue that underpricing tends to undermine the fundamental goal of
federal securities law at the expense of issuers. On the other hand, it is likely in the case
of any serious fraud that share price will fall well below offering price even if the
offering is underpriced. Therefore, it seems quite possible that the market has
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Third, underwriters may use underpricing as currency for many
other purposes. It can be used to reward good customers or to attract new
business, or it can be used as part of a package deal in which investors
agree to buy other securities or services at prices that are less attractive. 
6
Indeed, such practices were at the core of much of the IPO litigation (both
civil and criminal) that followed the dotcom bust.
1 7
It is important to note that the underwriter cannot sell shares for
more (or less) than the specified offering price in a fixed price offering.
Because the offering price is stated in the registration statement and the
prospectus, it is illegal to sell shares that are part of the offering at any other
price. Obviously, if it were possible for the underwriter to follow the
market up and sell shares at higher prices as the market price rises, it would
be tempting to do so. So why is it that there are no at-the-market IPOs?1 8
The underwriter could double its fee if the subject stock doubled in price
during the first day. One answer is that under the 1933 Act, an underwriter
would be at risk to the extent that the market price declines from the price
at which shares are sold as part of the offering, so it is not clear that
underwriters would want to do an at-the-market IPO even if they could.
Given the liability rules under the 1933 Act, it is much safer to stick with a
fixed price offering and use the gain as currency for other purposes.
Indeed, if the gain to underwriters from other uses of underpricing exceeds
the additional fees that could be earned without underpricing-and they
effectively struck a workable balance between investor protection and investor
opportunism.
16 See Oh, supra note 1, at 630-32. See also Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Should
Issuers Be on the Hook for Laddering? An Empirical Analysis of the IPO Market
Manipulation Litigation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 179 (2004); Peter H. Huang, New
Perspectives and Legal Implications: Trust, Guilt, and Securities Regulation, 151 U. PA.
L. REV. 1059 (2003); Ely R. Levy, The Law and Economics of IPO Favoritism and
Regulatory Spin, 33 Sw. U. L. REV. 185 (2004); Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CoRP.
L. 735 (2004); Lucas C. Townsend, Comment, Can Wall Street's "Global Resolution"
Prevent Spinning? A Critical Evaluation of Current Alternatives, 34 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1121 (2004). Some commentators have also suggested that IPO pricing and
success may be related to the prestige of the lawyers involved. See Royce de Rohan
Barondes et al., Law Firm Prestige and Performance in IPOs: Underwriters' Counsel as
Gatekeeper or Turnstile, Contracting and Organizations Research Institute, Working
Paper No. 03-08, (2004); Royce de Rohan Barondes & Gary C.Sanger, Lawyer
Experience And IPO Pricing (2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-227729.
17 See e.g. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2389 (2007);
In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, 471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2006).
i It is not clear that the SEC would approve an at-the-market IPO. Although the 1933
Act is not supposed to dictate the terms of an offering, it is not clear that it is possible to
file a registration statement for an IPO without specifying an offering price. Although
there are rules and forms that specifically contemplate at-the-market offerings by
companies that are already public, none is available for use in connection with an IPO.
See, e.g., SEC Form S-3; see also Hurt, supra note 1, at 8.
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easily could-investment bankers would have no interest in changing the
system.19
One final explanation (of sorts) for underpricing is that those with
standing to complain otherwise gain from the practice. Although the issuer
could have raised more money, the stockholders see the value of their own
stock skyrocket. On the other hand, the company (and the existing
stockholders' stock) would be worth still more if the company sold its stock
at a higher price. 20 But the thinking (or double thinking) may be that if the
issuer tries to squeeze too much out of the offering, investors will not be as
eager to bid up the price.
Notwithstanding the foregoing theories that blame underpricing on
underwriters, there must be more to the story. Underwriters have every
incentive to maximize offering price. With the standard flat rate discount
of seven percent, the underwriter stands to make more money at a higher
offering price.2' Moreover, underwriters should compete with one another
19 See Oh, supra note 1, at 631.
20 See Hurt, supra note 1, at 6; Oh, supra note 1, at 867-68; Raymond Hennessey, Start-
Ups Still Fail to Benefit Fully as IPO Prices Soar, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2000, at C2 1.
One might think that the corporation and the selling stockholders (if any) would have a
claim against the underwriters who serve as their agents, but such claims are typically
waived as a condition of the underwriting agreement (despite the fact that the SEC
regards such waivers as contrary to public policy). Moreover, given that one has no
standing to sue for an injury to the corporation unless one is a stockholder at the time of
the wrong, there is usually no one left who can sue the underwriter.
21 Competition works slowly in the underwriting market. See United States v.
Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Traditionally, issuers seldom switch
underwriters. But see Michael Siconolfi, More Firms Switch Underwriters, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 19, 1996, at C1; Mullaney, supra note 6, at 112 (reporting that many
firms switch underwriters for follow-on offerings possibly because of underpricing
of IPO); Randall Smith & Thomas T. Vogel, Jr., Time Warner Muscles Its
Underwriters, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1993, at Cl (reporting that Time Warner was
able to dictate terms of a series of deals because of competition among
underwriters seeking the business). To be sure, underwriters appear to compete
vigorously to win client companies in the first place. Indeed, such competition was
at the heart of many of the alleged abuses during the dotcom frenzy, and it does
appear that some underwriters are better at pricing than others. Oh, supra note 1, at
869-70. Presumably, issuers will seek out the best underwriter they can retain,
though it may be that the best underwriters will be choosy about the issuers they
take on. One significant problem is that the price for an IPO is never fixed until the
night before the offering. By then, the offering has entailed so much work and
expense that an issuer would be reluctant to call it off. Moreover, the issuer is in no
position to argue with an underwriter who advises that market conditions dictate a
lower than anticipated price. After all, the issuer and its controlling stockholders
seldom do more than one IPO, whereas the underwriter is a repeat player.
Therefore, it is possible that underwriters can engage in bait and switch tactics if
they want to do so. But again, an underwriter is a repeat player in the market and
knows that word will get around if it engages in opportunistic tactics.
2008]
654 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 2:2
JOURNAL
to sell an issuer's stock at the highest possible price.22 Indeed, several firms
have sought to develop ways to capture the benefit of underpricing for their
23issuer clients. Most notably W. R. Hambrecht & Co. and Wit Capital
Group have used the internet to conduct Dutch Auction offerings.24 The
results have been mixed at best.2 5  In addition, there are numerous
alternatives to underwritten offerings ranging from do-it-yourself sales over
the internet to out and out stock giveaways. 2 6 Yet none of these alternatives
has made much of a dent in the traditional IPO business, where
21
underpricing remains common.
IIi. DUTCH AUCTION OFFERINGS
Leaving aside for the moment the question of why traditional IPOs
tend to be underpriced, one possible solution is to conduct IPOs by means
28
of a modified Dutch Auction. In a Dutch Auction Offering (DAO), the
underwriter in effect solicits bids for the offering from potential investors,
including the price that the investor is willing to pay and the quantity that
the investor is willing to buy. After all the bids are compiled, the issuer
(underwriter) sells the stock at the highest price that will result in selling all
the shares-the clearing price. Investors who bid higher than the clearing
price are allocated the quantity for which they bid at the clearing price even
though they bid more. But, there may be more investors who bid exactly
the clearing price than there are shares that remain available after filling the
orders of those who bid higher. If so, the remaining shares are allocated pro
29
rata to the investors who bid that price .
22 See Oh, supra note 1.
2 Anthony Perkins, POs Go Dutch, and Small Investors Gain, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12,
1999, at A18.24 Wit Capital later became Soundview Technology Group and was acquired by
Schwab.
25 See generally Hurt, supra note 1; Oh, supra note 1; Randall Smith, So Far, 'E-
Underwriting' Gets a Slow Start, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1999, at Cl; Terzah
Ewing, Too Hot an IPO? Andover.net's 2 5 2 % Pop Raises Questions About
Underwriter's 'Dutch Auction, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1999, at C1. See also Anand,
supra note 1.
26 See generally Denis T. Rice, Recent Developments in Qffering Securities on the
internet, in ANNUAL DEVELOPMENTS IN BUSINESS FINANCING (ABA Section of
Business Law, 2000).
27 See generally Griffith, supra note 8.
21 See Anand, supra note 1; Hurt, supra note 1; Oh, supra note 1.29 In a true Dutch Auction, buyers buy at varying prices until the subject matter
sells out. In other words, a true Dutch Auction may involve price discrimination.
Cf Griffith, supra note 8 (arguing that fixed price offerings involve price
discrimination). In addition, DAOs differ from true Dutch Auctions in other ways
in order to comply with federal securities law. For example, in a DAO investor
offers to purchase do not become binding until the offer is priced because federal
securities law prohibits the formation of contracts to buy before a registration
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For example, suppose that Sunshine Desserts Corporation wants to
sell 1,000,000 shares. Its underwriter receives the following bids leading
up to the offering.
50,000 at 25
150,000 at 24
300,000 at 22
400,000 at 21
500,000 at 20
The offering price would be set at 20 but 900,000 shares would go
(at 20) to investors who were willing to pay more. Only 100,000 would
remain for those investors who bid 20, and they would be allocated only 20
shares for each 100 shares for which they bid.30
statement goes effective. See generally Hurt, supra note 1. Modified Dutch
Auctions are used in several other settings involving securities, including the sale
of Treasury bonds and repurchases of stock. See also Moshe Bumovski, Reverse
Price Tender Offers, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 295 (1988). It is noteworthy that US
law has an inexplicable but strong egalitarian streak. Not only does the 1933 Act
effectively dictate fixed price offerings, the 1934 Act rules relating to tender offers
require that the same price be paid to all tendering stockholders, and many states
have adopted fair price statutes that require that the same price be paid in a follow
up merger as is paid in a front end tender offer. See Richard A. Booth, The Problem
with Federal Tender Offer Law, 77 CAL. L. REV. 707 (1989); Richard A. Booth,
The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1635 (1988). And as a
matter of antitrust law, the Robinson-Patman Act generally prohibits price
discrimination. 15 U.S.C. §13 (2006).
30 One of the problems with a DAO is that technically bids are not legally enforceable
until the price is set and the registration statement becomes final. That might permit
bidders to game the system by entering false bids that would be unenforceable if the
investor changes his mind. This risk is minimized by underwriters accepting winning
bids as of the moment the registration goes effective. Therefore, the danger of placing a
false bid is that it might be accepted. On the other hand, the danger in a traditional
offering is that the price will be set higher than expected, so a DAO is less risky for
investors than is a traditional offering. That in turn may induce investors to bid a bit
more (or order a few more shares) than they otherwise would. This suggests yet another
reason for underpricing, namely, that it compensates investors for effectively
committing to buy shares before they know the price. Chalk and Peavey have suggested
a similar theory for underpricing before the advent of DAOs. They argue that book
building is essentially a discriminatory auction in which potential investors have no
way of knowing the reservation prices of other investors. Once the offering is complete,
the shares become the subject of a continuous competitive auction in the aftermarket in
which buy and sell orders equilibrate. Investors face less risk because price discovery is
more efficient. All are therefore willing to pay a bit more. Hence the price of the subject
stock tends to rise. See Andrew J. Chalk & John W. Peavy II, Understanding the
Pricing oflnitial Public Offerings, 8 RES. FIN. 203, 206 (1990); Andrew J. Chalk &
John W. Peavy I1, 1POs: Why Individuals Don't Get the "Hot" Issues, 9 AAII J. 16
(March 1987). 1 offer a somewhat similar argument below based on the effects of
investor diversification and portfolio investors. These explanations for underpricing
may also operate in the context of a DAO, which is also a discriminatory auction.
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The theory is that a DAO should eliminate underpricing by
allocating shares to the investors who are willing to pay more. To be sure,
most of the investors who are allocated shares would have been willing to
pay more, but because their orders were filled, they need not buy shares in
the aftermarket. There is no reason for a price pop. In addition,
underwriters charge a lower fee (discount) for DAOs. For example,
Hambrecht charges just 3% rather than the standard 7% that most
underwriters charge for a traditional fixed price, firm commitment offering.
To some extent, this lower fee may be a temporary special offer designed to
attract business, but the lower fee may also reflect lower costs. DAOs use
the internet heavily instead of costly road shows and other face-to-face
meetings to build a book of investors.
DAOs have succeeded to some extent in eliminating the price pop,
but there have been notable exceptions. The question is why have DAOs
not made a bigger dent in the traditional underwriting business. Why are
there still so few DAOs as compared to traditional fixed price, firm
commitment IPOs? One possible reason is that, aside from a lower fee, a
DAO is not fundamentally different from old-fashioned book building by
the underwriter if it is done in good faith. In theory, a traditional
underwriter should seek out the same investors that would be attracted by a
DAO. This suggests that underpricing may come from some source other
than underwriter opportunism.
IV. OTHER ALTERNATIVES
In addition to DAOs, there are several other alternative methods of
going public that may address the underpricing problem in one way or
another.
First, one obvious alternative is for the issuer to do a direct offering
of shares without retaining the services of an underwriter. 31 Such do-it-
yourself offerings were virtually impossible before the advent of the
internet, but several issuers have attempted such direct offerings via the
internet. The problem with a direct offering (according to conventional
wisdom) is that investors do not like offerings without underwriters who are
committed to supporting the stock after the offering. There are really two
arguments here. One is that investors depend on underwriters as
reputational intermediaries to vouch for the quality of the subject stock.
The other is that investors dislike stocks for which there is no assured
aftermarket. An underwriter is effectively committed to making a market in
Moreover, it may be that investors honor their bids in DAOs because they have been
denied access to traditional (underpriced) IPOs.31 See Anita I. Anand, The Efficiency of Direct Public Offerings, 7 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 433 (2003); William K. Sjostrom, Going Public Through an
Internet Direct Public Offering: A Sensible Alternative for Small Companies?, 53
FLA. L. REv. 529 (2001).
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a stock it offers. If the underwriter ceases to make a market, it is likely that
the price will collapse and the underwriter (as well as the issuer) will
become the target of an action under the 1933 Act. In contrast, even if the
issuer has arranged for a market maker in connection with a direct offering,
there is no assurance that the market maker will support the stock forever.32
Second, some companies seek to go public by means of a reverse
merger. In a reverse merger, the company that wants to go public finds a
publicly traded shell company (or possibly a company that is publicly
traded that wants to go private) and enters into a merger agreement with the
shell company in which the shell issues a large number of shares to the
subject company. For example, suppose that Acme Fireworks Corporation
is a publicly traded company with one million shares of public float. Acme
conducts a minimal business and it trades at about one dollar per share.
Binford Tools Corporation wants to go public but does not want to
undertake the expensive and time-consuming registration process required
by federal law. Acme and Binford enter into a merger agreement whereby
Acme will be the surviving company and will issue nine million shares to
Binford stockholders as consideration. (Acme also agrees to change its
name to Binford.) When the smoke clears, old Binford stockholders own
nine million shares of new Binford, which is now publicly traded with a
float of one million shares. (To complete the deal, new Binford might split
off the old Acme business in exchange for whatever shares were held by the
controlling stockholders of old Acme, after which Acme would be a private
company wholly owned by its old controlling stockholders. Reverse
mergers are sometimes called going public through the back door. Such
deals have a dubious reputation, though it is not really clear why. No
investors are typically harmed in the process if no new funds are raised, but
for some reason avoiding the 1933 Act registration process has given the
reverse merger a bad name even though the surviving company must
immediately register as a public company under the 1934 Act and provide
most of the same information that would have been required in a 1933 Act
registration statement anyway. To be sure, the subject company need not
comply in advance with federal securities law as a condition of becoming a
public company. But the 1933 Act is supposed to be a disclosure statute-
one with which any company can comply simply by telling the facts. Thus,
it may be that the reputation of reverse mergers is mostly the product of
badmouthing by traditional investment banks.3 3
32 Incidentally, this is yet another way in which the 1933 Act has ossified the
securities business and heightened barriers to entry. On the other hand, it is not
clear that it is necessary to compel someone to make a market in a stock. It may be
that market makers will seek out just about any stock that needs a market made.
But as far as the issuer is concerned, it may seem too risky to leave such matters to
chance.
33 In the late 1990s, the SEC cracked down on reverse mergers indirectly by
requiring that all companies listed for public trading be registered under the 1934
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Third, another alternative means of making a public offering is a
private investment in public equity (PIPE).34 In a typical PIPE deal, a
company that needs capital sells a large block of stock to an investment
bank, hedge fund, or private equity group by means of an exempt private
placement. The buyer holds the stock for some time and then registers it
for sale as a secondary offering-an offering by a selling stockholder. The
trick is (or was) that the SEC does not closely scrutinize such secondary
offerings. The issuer in a PIPE deal is usually already publicly traded but is
small and thinly traded-has relatively few shares outstanding in the hands
of outside investors. Indeed, if an issuer has $75 million in public float, it
would likely qualify to use Form S-3 and would be able to file a shelf
registration for a dribble out at-the-market offering. Thus, companies that
do PIPEs are by definition companies with less than $75 million in equity
outstanding.35 PIPEs are associated with reverse mergers because many of
the same securities firms handle the two types of transactions. Moreover, it
is common for a reverse merger to be combined with a PIPE transaction.
36
Fourth, yet another way for a company to go public is to give away
stock for free or minimal consideration. Several companies in recent years
have sought to give away their stock for free or in exchange for minimal
consideration such as visiting an internet site or registering on the site.37 A
Act irrespective of size whether or not the company has 500 or more stockholders
or $10 million or more in assets. It remains possible for unregistered companies to
be traded in the pink sheets. It is not clear whether the new rules have discouraged
reverse mergers, because a company seeking to go public by such means would
almost always plan to register under the 1934 Act anyway.
14 See generally William K. Sjostrom, PIPEs, 2 ENTREPREN. Bus. L.J. 1 (2007).
" The SEC has also sought to rein in the use of PIPEs by limiting the number of
shares that it will permit to be registered as a secondary offering. Whereas it was
common up until 2006 for a secondary offering to include several times the number
of shares outstanding prior to the offering, the SEC now limits secondary offerings
to no more than one-third of the number of shares the issuer has outstanding. See
Gregory Sichenzia, Presentation at the unpublished presentation at this symposium:
IPOs in the Internet Age (March 2, 2007); Judith Bums, SEC Slows Flow of PIPE
Deals to a Trickle, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2006, at C1.
36 PIPEs have also been associated with some arguably questionable tactics. In
some cases, buyers in PIPEs transactions sell short the stock they buy in the private
placement arguably driving down the price. In many PIPEs deals, the issuer agrees
to a formula that requires the transfer of more shares for the same agreed
consideration if the shares trade at a lower price-sometimes called a death spiral
deal. In some such deals, buyers have been known to sell short many more shares
than are even outstanding, raising questions about whether the short sales can be
covered and are therefore legal. Of course, if the buyer has the right to buy more
and more shares as the price declines, the short sales can be covered accordingly.
37 Gregory Zuckerman, SEC Clears Web Firms'Stock Giveaway, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 16, 1999, at C 1; Scott Thurm, SEC Questions Start-Ups' Cheap Stock Sales
to Customers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2000, at C 1:3 (discussing use of stock rather
than cash to pay for goods and services and thus augment earnings). Denis T. Rice,
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stock giveaway may seem a strange idea at first, but the cost of a public
offering (in the form of fees, expenses, discounts and underpricing) is likely
to be about 30% of the proceeds. So if one can establish a public market by
giving away stock worth some amount less than that, it makes sense to do
so. One can then return to the market later-after the stock is seasoned and
an efficient price has been established-to raise capital.
Fifth, there are several regulatory schemes that can be used by
smaller businesses to make public offerings. SEC Regulation A permits
offerings of up to $10 million using a much simplified registration scheme
that also omits many of the restrictions and potential liabilities that attend a
full-blown registration.38  SEC Rule 504 permits offerings of up to
$1,000,000 without federal registration if the offering is registered in one of
the states. 39 Regulation S permits off-shore offerings of stock if the stock is
held off-shore for at least one year. 40  And the London Stock Exchange
Alternative Investment Market ("AIM") provides a much simplified
offering process geared to the needs of small issuers.4 1
Free Stock on the Internet Is Not a Menace, 13 Insights, No. 9, at 8, Oct. 1999.This
is not necessarily an internet phenomenon. Rather, it has only been made practical
by the internet. For an older example of a similar tactic, see SEC v. Datronics
Engineers, Inc., 490 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1973).
38 Regulation A has not been widely used. See Rutheford Campbell, Regulation A:
Small Businesses' Search For "A Moderate Capital, "31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77 (2006). It
is not clear why. It may be that an underwriter is necessary and offerings are too small.
See also Anita i. Anand & Lewis D. Johnson, The Role of Undernvriters in
Nontraditional Offerings: Empirical Evidence, Queen's Univ. Law & Economics Paper
No. 2005-05 (April 2005); Christine Hurt, Initial Public Offerings and the Failed
Promise of Disintermediation, 2 ENTREPREN. Bus. L.J. 703.
'9 See Sjostrom, supra note 32.
40 In practice Regulation S works much like a PIPE deal, but the one-year off-shore
holding period for equity securities makes impractical by comparison. See Richard
Cameron Blake, Advising Clients on Using the Internet to Make Offers of Securities in
Offshore Offerings, 55 Bus. LAW. 177 (1999). See also Stephen J. Choi, The Unfounded
Fear of Regulation S: Empirical Evidence on Qffshore Securities Qfferings, 50 DUKE
L.J. 663 (2000); Stephen J. Choi, Resales of Offshore Securities into the United States:
Evaluating the Overvaluation Risk to U. S. Investors, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 519 (2000).
41 See generally Dale A. Oesterle, The High Cost of lPOs Depresses Venture Capital in
the United States, I ENTREPREN. Bus. L. J 369, 376-78 (discussing AIM market in
detail). There have been numerous efforts in both the U.S. and elsewhere to
establish special markets for emerging companies, but none has been as successful
as the LSE AIM. Most AIM listed companies go public by means of an offering to
a select group of institutional investors. The cost of an offering is about 40 percent
of an offering in the United States and takes eight to twelve weeks rather than the
six to eight months required to do an offering in the United States. And there is
little problem ofunderpricing (possibly because shares are placed with institutional
investors). One reason that offerings are cheaper on AIM is that there is no
underwriter as such. Rather, each company must retain a nominated advisor
(NOMAD) who conducts due diligence and vouches for the suitability of the
company to be listed on AIM. The NOMAD effectively performs the certification
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Finally, although it is not really a different technique, one way to
minimize the cost of underpricing is to minimize the number of shares one
offers as part of a traditional IPO. Assuming that an IPO will be
underpriced, it clearly makes sense for a company to offer as few shares as
possible to establish a market price and then to sell more shares in a follow-
on offering. 42  In other words, smaller offerings may themselves be a
reaction to underpricing. 43 If an issuer can establish a public market by
offering a minimal number of shares, the issuer can then return to the
market with another offering after the market establishes a price for the
shares. There should be no danger of a price pop in a subsequent offering.
If anything, the worry is that the price of the shares may decline because of
increased supply. This would suggest that over time or in particularly
active IPO markets, the percentage of shares offered should tend to
decline.44
It is noteworthy that these methods mix and match the benefits of
going public in different ways. Although it is common to think of an IPO
as a way for the issuer to raise capital, an IPO is also a way to gain access
to liquidity, which (among other things) may permit insiders to cash out.
Indeed, these two functions can be combined variously in a traditional IPO.
Although most traditional IPOs are exclusively of shares being sold by the
issuer, it is quite common for a traditional IPO to include shares being sold
by stockholders (particularly VC stockholders). Of the alternatives
described above, both the reverse merger and the stock giveaway are deals
that are designed solely to gain access to the market. Neither method raises
capital for the company though both might make it easier for the company
to raise capital in the future by means of a subsequent offering. These deals
seem to confirm that there is value in access to the market beyond the
function of a US underwriter but without the need to put capital at risk. In addition,
AIM has limited and modest listing requirements. AIM has been quite successful
with 335 IPOs in 2005 compared to 35 on NASDAQ. The average AIM offering
was $18.7 million compared to $117.5 million on NASDAQ. And although AIM
companies are smaller than NASDAQ companies, they sport higher valuations,
suggesting that AIM investors are willing to take more risk. There are
approximately 2500 companies listed on AIM.
42 Suzanne McGee & Terzah Ewing, 'Piggyback' Deals: Keys to Unlock Insiders'
IPO Stakes, WALL ST. J., February 17, 2000, at C1:3.
43 It may be, too, that investors assume more risk that the price will be incorrect if
the offering is relatively small and that therefore a bigger pop is required to be built
into the price. Or it may be that underwriters find it inherently more difficult to
price a smaller offering.
44 Daines and Klausner assembled data for 310 IPOs during the period 1994 to 1997.
During that period, the average offering was for 35% of outstanding shares and about
12 .3 % of that was sold by selling stockholders. See Robert Daines & Michael Klausner,
Do IPOs Maximize Firm Value: An Empirical Study ofAntitakeover Protections, 17
J.L. ECON & ORG. 83 (2001) (Table 1). In the thirty-four October 1999 IPOs studied
here, the average offering was for 19 .8 % of the shares.
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capital one can raise in a public offering. On the other hand, the direct
offering and the PIPE seem to be more about raising money than they are
about establishing a market.
V. WHY AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING?
The foregoing illustrates that there are many reasons for going
public and being public. This suggests that how the market reacts to the
offering and the first day price pop may be related to the reason for an IPO.
So the question is why do firms go public?
First, firms go public to raise equity capital. But, as noted above, this
cannot be the only reason for going public, because often firms go public
without raising any capital at all. Moreover, there are many other sources
of equity capital, including venture capital firms and private equity firms.
And that is not to mention debt financing. Moreover, it is quite expensive
to raise equity capital by means of an IPO. As suggested above, the total
cost of an IPO is probably about 30% of the offering amount on average.
And it is not cheap to remain public thereafter. The indirect expenses of
being public such as exposure to stockholder lawsuits and management
distraction are also significant (even when discounted by probability).
Finally, a public company must generate market returns for its stockholders
that historically average about 15% at the median and even more for
companies in riskier lines of business.45 For all this, the company gets the
benefit of whatever capital it raises in the IPO, while the gains go to the
stockholders. It is difficult to believe that this can be a good deal for many
issuer companies. So there must be other benefits of going public by means
of an IPO, and they must be quite significant. After all, an initial public
offering is never a last ditch option. If anything it is a first ditch option.
Second, one of the primary benefits of going public is that it
permits insiders to cash out of the business. One might think that the
market would dislike this motivation because insiders will presumably want
to sell high. On the other hand, the ability to bail out goes with the
territory. Once a company is publicly held there is really no way to prevent
insiders from selling at an opportune time. Still, one might expect offerings
to include some sort of assurance that insiders will retain their interests
(beyond lockups designed to control trading in the immediate aftermarket).
To the contrary, however, it is common for offerings to include shares to be
sold by existing stockholders. Surprisingly, secondary offerings (offerings
by selling stockholders rather than by the issuing company) tend to perform
46better than offerings in which the money actually goes to the company.
41 See Ibbotson Associates, SBBI 2004 YEARBOOK, Table 2-1 (arithmetic mean return
for stocks during the period 1926 to 2003 was 12.4% for large company stocks and 17.5
percent for small company stocks).
46 Inmoo Lee, Do Firms Knowingly Sell Overvalued Equity?, 52 J. FIN. 4 (Sept. 1997)
(finding that among seasoned issuers, companies offering additional stock by selling
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This finding is somewhat counterintuitive in that one would think investors
would be suspicious of offerings by which existing shareholders seek to
bail out of their own investments rather than to raise money for the
company. But there is an alternative explanation for why an insider would
want to bail out. Insiders are generally underdiversified. Typically, a large
percentage of an insider's portfolio is invested in the subject company in
part because the insider cannot easily sell. Moreover, if the insider is
actively involved in the management of the company, he also has much of
his human capital invested in the same place. Going public permits insiders
to diversify their holdings and reduce risk without any sacrifice of expected
return. That constitutes a gain. And it is a gain that does not depend on any
change in the price of the subject company stock. In other words, it does
not necessarily follow that just because an insider seeks to sell, he expects
the price of the stock to go down. Indeed, given the legal sanctions that
attend fraudulent offerings and insider trading, the urge to diversify is a
much more likely explanation for going public. 47 In addition, although
shares offered by stockholders presumably reduce the capital available to
the company (on the theory that the company can only support so much
outstanding stock), it may be that investors are suspicious of companies that
need equity capital. Perhaps investors figure that a company with good
prospects ought to be able to raise capital privately or in the debt market
and, therefore, that establishing a trading market for the company's shares
is the most believable reason for going public.
48
stockholders perform better than companies offering additional stock for the company
account). But see Danielle Sessa & Terzah Ewing, Some Insiders Sell Shares at Time of
1PO, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1999, at Cl. It is possible that secondary offerings do better
because they are discounted from the beginning. See also Carol A. Marquardt &
Christine I. Wiedman, Voluntary Disclosure, Information Asymmetry, and Insider
Selling Through Secondary Equity Offerings, 15 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 505 (1998)
(finding that disclosure tends to be better in connection with secondary offerings). Cf
Stephen J. Choi, The Informational Effect of an Offshore Securities Qffering:
Evaluating the Risk to U.S. Investors, 78 WASH. U. L. Q. 519 (2000).
47 There are numerous examples of diversification as a motivation. In 1966, the
popularity of swap funds induced amendment to section 351 the Internal Revenue
Code, 26 U.S.C. § 351 (2006), making such transactions taxable on the theory that an
investor enjoys a gain from diversification. And in the 1990s, the SEC adopted Rules
IOb-5(1) & (2) in part to provide a safe harbor for insider sales pursuant to standing
orders, on the theory that such sales are legitimately motivated by insiders' seeking
diversification.
48 Catch 22 comes to mind. One might also characterize resistance to companies
that need capital as a reverse Groucho Marx effect. That is, maybe the market likes
only companies that do not much need the market. This is consistent with the fact
that more stock is bought back in the aggregate during most years than is sold to
the public. It may also be the case that many secondary offerings are made by
venture capital investors and that their earlier involvement with the company
signals to the market that the company's prospects are better. If so, there should be
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Third, being publicly held permits a company to use equity as
compensation.49 To be sure, the use of options as compensation has
developed a dicey reputation in recent years ultimately because it is seen as
diluting the interests of outside investors. But the use of options (and stock)
as compensation also has the effect of supporting stock price going forward.
Options are attractive only if the recipients think that stock price is likely to
increase over the long haul. So the use of options as a significant
component of compensation has a bonding effect. Moreover, it is common
practice among companies that use equity as compensation to repurchase
outstanding shares to control for dilution. Otherwise, when options are
exercised, the number of outstanding shares will increase and earning per
share will decrease. ° So options also induce issuers to distribute cash to
the market and to do so in a way that has the biggest bang for the buck-by
buying back the shares of the least optimistic stockholders.
Fourth, some companies go public because they have no choice. In
many cases, venture capital investors require investee companies to go
public or sell out by a specified date. And sometimes successful companies
that have used equity as compensation find that the population of
stockholders grows to the point that the company must register with the
SEC as a public company. For example, Google decided to make a public
offering of its stock in large part because it was required to be public under
SEC regulations.
some correlation between particular venture capital investors and aftermarket
performance.
49 See, e.g, Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (company went
public primarily to use equity compensation and went private because market price
stagnated).
50 In addition, being publicly held gives a company access to market pricing which in
turn provides important feedback to management. To be specific, management may
look to the reaction of the market to help decide if its strategies are on track. One might
call this the Ed Koch How Am I Doing effect. This is a variation on the notion that the
market acts to discipline public companies. But in this setting, the idea is that some
companies seek out the discipline of the market. For example, market feedback may be
quite important in conglomerate companies with disparate lines of business where
middle managers may not fully appreciate the value added by each other's efforts. On
the other hand, one of the fundamental problems faced by such companies is that equity
compensation does not work especially well when results are less clearly tied to one's
efforts. Indeed, it might be tempting for the management of one division to slack off
and free ride on the efforts of other divisions. It seems unlikely that this factor alone
would ever be a reason to go public. Indeed, some might say that the need to deal with
the market is one of the big downsides of being public. Nevertheless, plenty of
companies that could go private choose to remain public. So it may be that in some
settings it is important to have the market as an arbiter. At the very least, the CEO can
use the market as an excuse for difficult decisions. Cf Bernard S. Black, Information
Asymmetry, the Internet, and Securities Offerings, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 91
(1998) (discussing Netscape's solicitation of VC investors not for the capital but rather
for added legitimacy in advance of IPO).
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The above reasons for going public and for being public are not
mutually exclusive. Indeed, it is possible (if not common) for an IPO to be
motivated by varying combinations of all of these reasons, although one
reason or another may predominate and affect the reception for an IPO. For
example, the market may prefer companies that offer a relatively large
percentage of shares to the public on the theory that the company will be
more exposed to takeover and the discipline of the market. It is also
possible that the reason for the offering affects the way it is done.
Sometimes the effect may be obvious, as where the offering explicitly
includes a large number of shares offered by stockholders. But in other
situations, the reason for the offering may be difficult to divine. For
example, if the company offers relatively few shares, it may plan to offer
more in the future. So the market may discount the shares in the IPO.
A. The Evidence
Although numerous explanations have been offered for the
apparent systematic underpricing of IPOs, there has been relatively little
investigation of whether underpricing can be correlated with the terms of an
offering. 51 The question is: Are there any identifiable factors that cause the
market to bid up the price of some IPOs more than others? In order to see
whether and how the reason for an IPO affects market reception, I gathered
data for the thirty-four IPOs conducted during October 1999. 1 limited the
period to one month in order to avoid differing market conditions that could
affect market reception. 2 Moreover, it may be that offering terms evolve
5' Robert Daires and Michael Klausner, supra note 45; See also Steven Lipin,
Firms Incorporated in Delaware Are Valued More by Investors, WALL ST. J., Feb.
28, 2000, at C2 1; Frank Easterbrook, International Corporate Differences: Markets
or Law, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., available at
htt[://papers.ssrn.com/sol13/papers.cfn?abstract id-8179 (Winter 1997); Rafael
LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shliefer & Robert Vishny, Legal
Determinants of External Finance, Working Paper No. 5879 (Jan. 1997) (finding
that stronger legal protections of common law countries lead to stronger stock
market than in civil law countries); The Law of the Market, ECONOMIST, Apr. 19,
1997, at 78 (discussing LaPorta study). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Convergence
and its Critics: What are the Preconditions to the Separation of Ownership and
Control? (unpublished manuscript); John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in
Takeover Defenses: Failure in the Corporate Law Market (unpublished
manuscript) (both finding diminishing differences between two systems). See
generally Antonio S. Mello & John E. Parsons, Auctions of Shares with a
Secondary Market and Tender Offers, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1077 (Dec.
1994) (arguing that method of sale of company, whether through IPO or
negotiation, is or should be a result of competition among various types of investor
buyers).
52 These thirty-four IPOs occurred from Oct. I to Oct. 26, during which period the
S&P500 went from 1282.81 to 1281.91 with an interim high of 1335.21 on Oct. 11
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during a wave of IPOs. For example, companies may be able to offer
smaller and smaller (or larger and larger) percentages of shares as an IPO
market evolves. So in order to compare apples to apples it is important to
limit the sample to a short time span in which all issuers face the same
conditions. Needless to say, October 1999 was near the height of the
dotcom boom and the irrational exuberance that went with it. The upside is
that this single month offers a relatively large sample of deals. The
downside is that October 1999 is not a typical month. But the point is to
compare the terms of IPOs during that month with each other. So the
particular month may not matter much.
The accompanying chart sets forth data for the October 1999 IPOs.
In addition to the issuer name and ticker, the underwriter, and the date of
the offering, the chart shows the offering price, the first day closing price,
the first day price pop as a percentage of the offering price, the number of
shares offered, the number of shares outstanding after the offer, the number
of shares offered as a percent of outstanding after the offer, the number of
additional shares that the underwriters may buy pursuant to option (the so-
called Green Shoe Option or simply the shoe in Street lingo), the number of
options outstanding, the reserve for additional options, the total number of
shares outstanding assuming exercise of all options, and the fully diluted
market capitalization assuming exercise of all options.5 3
and an interim low of 1247.41 on Oct. 15. The S&P500 closed on the last trading
day of the month, Oct. 29, at 1362.93.
53 A Green Shoe Option (or overallotment option) permits an underwriter to buy up to
15% more shares from the issuer than the number stated in the offering. Although one
might think that the rationale for having a shoe in the deal is that it permits the
underwriter to cash in on a price pop in the aftermarket, the underwriter is precluded
under the 1933 Act from selling shares at a higher price than the offering price. The real
reason for a shoe is to permit the underwriter to sell the additional 15% in the first
place. For example, in a deal involving the issue of 10 million shares, suppose the
underwriter sells 11.5 million shares. The underwriter is effectively short by 1.5 million
shares. If demand for the IPO shares remains strong in the aftermarket, the underwriter
can exercise the green shoe option and cover its short position. If demand is weak, the
underwriter can buy back shares using the proceeds from the sale of the 1.5 million
shares-which did not really exist in the first place-to keep the market price from
falling below the offering price. In other words, the idea is to oversell the deal on
purpose, which may also explain to some extent why IPO prices tend to rise. This
option is usually called a Green Shoe Option (after the offering in which it was
originally used) or a Green Shoe or simply a shoe. Most underwriting agreements
include a shoe for the maximum 15 percent and, typically, for the maximum of 45 days
following the offering date. There can be some thorny issues as to who should supply
the shares for a shoe. Again, the underwriter will only exercise the shoe if the shares
increase in price. Thus, individual stockholders will not want the shares to come out of
their holdings. The underwriter and institutional stockholders may be averse, however,
to the potential for further dilution. And where there are distinct groups of stockholders
such as founders and various levels of VC investors, one group may prefer to see other
stockholders give up their shares rather than have the company issue additional shares.
Thus, the underwriting agreement should be clear as to who must provide the additional
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The last two columns show money on the table (in millions of
dollars) and money on the table as a percent of total outstanding shares.
The phrase money on the table refers to the dollar value of the first day
price pop times the number of shares offered (not including the shoe). This
is the additional amount that the issuer could have raised if all of the shares
offered had been sold at the first day closing price- the total dollar amount
of underpricing. The last column shows total underpricing as a percentage
of fully diluted market capitalization. Thus, the chart is designed primarily
to permit comparison of various aspects of the offerings to the first day
price pop.
In addition to the above data, the appendix lists the stated reasons
for the IPOs in the study as taken from the prospectus summary for each.
B. Analysis
The data indicate that there may be an inverse correlation between
offering size (as a percentage of total outstanding shares) and the size of the
first day increase in stock price.5 4  In other words, smaller percentage
offerings tend to generate a bigger pop than do larger percentage
offerings.55
shares, and how the burden will be shared if the option is exercised as to some but not
all of the shares. It is interesting that the standard shoe is 15% of the planned offering
which is roughly equal to the average first day price pop. For data about shoe use, see
Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Are Firm Commitment Underwritings Risky?
The Role of the Over-Allotment Option (Feb. 1998) (unpublished manuscript) (finding
that over-allotment option is used to decrease risk and increase profits in successful
offering).
54 This hypothesis is based on a study of 34 IPOs occurring during October 1999. To be
sure, much has happened in the markets since then, including the dotcom bust and
numerous corporate scandals that began with the collapse of Enron. Moreover, one
might argue that October 1999 was at the height of the dotcom frenzy and thus is likely
to be highly idiosyncratic. On the other hand, the IPO market has not been nearly as
active since the end of 2000 as it was for the six years ending in 2000. So recent
markets may be atypical too. Moreover, there have been numerous hot issues markets
over the years, and there is every reason to believe that there will be more. Indeed,
the reason for limiting the study to one month is that market conditions may change
over a longer period. I chose October 1999 because it was relatively late in the
1995 to 2000 period and presumably reflected practices that had become fairly
standardized. Moreover, I chose October because (except for periodic market
crashes) it tends to be a business-as-usual month unaffected by summer vacations
or holidays. See e.g., Anand, supra note I (discussing unusual conditions in 1999
I PO market).
55 There are several different ways to measure and interpret this data. For example, it is
unclear precisely how to measure the amount of stock outstanding. Should one include
shares that have been reserved for employee stock option plans? In addition, companies
often go public by selling lesser voting stock to the public. Does the total number of
votes of the shares being sold compared to the total voting power affect performance in
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One possible explanation for why smaller percentage offerings
56
show a bigger first day pop is simple supply and demand . In other words,
the fewer the number of shares offered, the more intense the competition
for them. As I have argued elsewhere, downward sloping demand may
explain underpricing of iPOs generally. That is, given that IPOs are
typically sold by means of a fixed price offering, the price of the offering
must be set low enough to induce the least optimistic buyer to buy. And
given that the stock must be widely distributed (both legally and
practically), it seems likely that many optimistic investors will get fewer
shares than they would like to get.57 It is not clear, however, why supply
and demand should work disproportionately in favor of smaller offerings.
Moreover, one would think that the absolute number of shares available
would be more important than the percentage of shares offered. It is also
possible that the small size of an offering signals to the market that insiders
are more confident about the business and want to retain more shares or that
they hope for a subsequent offering at a higher price. 58 But neither of these
the aftermarket? What proportion were internet stocks? Is there a lockup correlation? Is
size of pop correlated with longer term gain?
56 Floyd Norris & Lawrence M. Fisher, Qffspring Outweighs Parent as Qffering
Hits the Market, N.Y.TIMES, March 3, 2000, at A1:4 (describing offering by 3Com
of shares in Palm, Inc., a 94 percent subsidiary after the offering: "The soaring
price for Palm partly reflected the fact that less than 5 percent of the outstanding
shares were available for trading, far from enough to satisfy investor demand").
Terzah Ewing & Joshua Harris Prager, Many Are Finding IPOs Still Out of Reach,
WALL ST. J., February 28, 2000, at C21:1 (discussing difficulty of small investors
in getting access to IPO shares).
57 Lockups may also have the effect of minimizing supply. One recent study
indicates that offerings with lockups maintain a higher price in the aflermarket,
though the difference was minimal with internet IPOs. See Danielle Sessa &
Terzah Ewing, Some Insiders Sell Shares at Time of lPO, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1,
1999, at Cl. The study is somewhat flawed in that it appears to include all year
2000 IPOs through August 30, 2000, thus including offerings made under differing
conditions and with radically different time on the market for seasoning. What does
a lockup signal to the market? Does market react differently to offerings by selling
stockholders than it does to unlocked shares? What difference does a lockup make
if the stockholder cannot sell until one year later anyway under Rule 144? See
Royce de Rohan Barondes, Adequacy of Disclosure of Restrictions on Flipping
IPO Securities (2002) (Working Paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/soll3/papers.cfm?abstract id 173248.
51 See Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of
Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 807 (1987) (discussing distinction between growth
companies and cash cows). Several of the IPOs in the sample consisted of lesser
voting stock. This did not seem to affect the market reception for the stock,
suggesting that investors do not particularly care about voting rights or the potential
for a change in control. Gilson has suggested that lesser voting stock may not
matter in the context of a growth company because management interests are
similar to stockholder interests. Id. See also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond:
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theories explains why an underwriter would fail to adjust the price of a
smaller percentage offering upward so as to avoid underpricing to the
extent possible. In other words, one would think that underwriters would
consider the quantity of stock to be sold in pricing the issue in the first
place.5 9
Another possible explanation for the excess price increase of
smaller offerings is that the market effectively charges a more or less fixed
amount for liquidity as a percentage of market capitalization. If so, one
would expect this liquidity charge to be a larger proportion of smaller
offerings-a larger pop. Indeed the data suggest that there may be some
truth to this explanation. As the last column of the chart shows, money on
the table tends to be relatively stable as a percentage of market
capitalization.
This explanation for (supposed) IPO underpricing raises more
questions than it answers. It suggests that somehow the market adjusts for
offering size and market capitalization irrespective of the absolute number
of shares being offered. In other words, a small company that offers a large
number of shares will give up about the same percentage of its post-offer
market capitalization as will a big company that offers a small number of
shares. How and why would the market make such a strange adjustment?
One possible answer is that the first day price pop has been
misinterpreted. Although the first day price pop is generally assumed to be
the result of underpricing, it is ultimately an ambiguous piece of
information. It is at least conceivable that a price pop occurs in offerings
that are properly priced. In other words, it may be that an offering at a
Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L.
REV. 11 (1988). Ironically, lesser voting stock would not have been a possibility
before the adoption of Rule 19c-4, a rule designed to protect stockholder
democracy, which was subsequently struck down in Business Roundtable v. SEC,
905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990), as beyond the authority of the SEC. Before the
adoption of the rule, a company with lesser voting stock could not be listed on the
NYSE. Thus, practically speaking, a company that aspired to be listed on the
NYSE at some later point would have needed to comply with NYSE rules or
undergo a messy recapitalization before being listed on the NYSE.
59 It is possible that as of October 1999, underwriters had not figured out downward
sloping demand and how to adjust for it in connection with relatively small offerings,
but it seems unlikely. The Dutch Auction is founded on the notion that the quantity
offered is inversely related to the market clearing price. The Dutch Auction has been
around for years and has been used extensively in connection with issuer repurchases
since the early 1980s. Moreover, the Dutch Auction model has more recently been used
by Wit Capital and Hambrecht & Company precisely in an effort to avoid underpricing
in connection with IPOs. In short, it is inconceivable that underwriters are not aware
that quantity is arguably a key factor in establishing the offering price. Some stock
exchanges require that a minimum percentage of shares be offered to the public. For
example, the Neuer Markt requires minimum often percent of stock to be sold unless
stock meets an aggregate value standard.
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higher price would fail to sell out, whereas when properly priced, the
offering sells out and-in a quantum mechanical jump-pops in price.
Indeed, the fact that several DAOs have experienced substantial price pops
suggests that some such other force may be at work. Call it the dark matter
of the market.60
To be specific, it is possible that an IPO is something like a tender
offer in reverse. Virtually all tender offers involve a premium over the
market price. On average, the premium is about 50% of the pre-offer price.
Although takeover premiums are usually thought to arise because the target
company has been mismanaged or because the bidder perceives the
possibility of gain through various changes in management, it is also
arguable that target stockholders require a premium simply in order to be
induced to tender. While some have argued that in an efficient market
composed primarily of diversified investors, any premium should be
enough, it is difficult to imagine that an offer at a minimal premium would
61induce many stockholders to tender their shares. In the context of an IPO,
it may be that investors will not buy a stock that is fully priced and will not
then sell that stock unless they can do so at a gain. This may be nothing
more than another example of the well-documented tendency to place a
62higher value on something one owns than on something one might buy.
Discounts (and premiums) may also be the result of downward
sloping demand for individual stocks.63  Although a diversified investor
who holds a portfolio of many stocks is a price-taker in a normal market,
the same investor may behave more like an undiversified investor in the
context of a takeover bid where it is clear that the bidder perceives that the
deal will generate financial gain. To be sure, a rational investor should
eschew stock picking and prognostication on the basis of company-specific
fundamentals. In other words, a rational investor should ordinarily pay
60 Moreover, the first day closing price is the price paid by the most optimistic investor.
There is no reason to think that all of the shares in the offering could have been sold for
that price. So it is not clear that total underpricing is equal to the price pop multiplied
by the number of shares offered. This point is well illustrated by DAOs. In a DAO, the
highest bidding investors are usually rather small in number. There is no reason to think
that the entire offering could ever be sold to the highest bidders. So there is no reason to
think that the aftermarket could absorb all of the shares in the IPO at the closing price.
As any market maker would agree, there is no such thing as single market price. Rather,
there are various prices at which investors are willing to buy and sell various quantities
of shares. Indeed, market technology reflects this fact.
61 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1168 (1981).
The authors argue that premiums are as high as they are because the law distorts the
market.
62 This phenomenon may be quite central to the way financial markets work. For
example, it may be the ultimate source of the bid-ask spread.
63 See Richard A. Booth, The Efficient Market, Portfolio Theory and the Downward
Sloping Demand Hypothesis, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1187 (1993). Downward sloping
demand may itself be the result of sticky valuation.
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little or no attention to the idea that this or that stock is underpriced or
overpriced. But the situation is different when a company is in play.
Although target stockholders may not know (or care) why a bidder
perceives the possibility of gain, they do know that the bidder wants the
target company. The bidder must think the target is worth more than the
offer price. So target stockholders will hold out for a share of the gain.
Indeed, studies indicate that most of the gain from takeovers goes to target
stockholders in the form of premiums.64
Similarly, an investor who buys into an IPO may focus on the
subject shares as if she were an undiversified investor. In a sense an
investor is undiversified with regard to IPO shares because she is being
asked to invest a substantial sum in a new stock without regard to her other
portfolio holdings. Thus, a diversified investor may be willing to pay only
the price that an undiversified investor would pay for the IPO stock. Once
the offering has been completed, diversified investors can buy the shares to
add to their portfolios. Because diversified investors assume no company
specific risk (or risk that the offering may fail), they are naturally willing to
pay more for the IPO shares in the aftermarket. It should come as no
surprise that the shares rise in price. 6' As in a tender offer, investors must
assume that the issuer expects somehow to gain from an IPO. If so,
investors will insist on some portion of the gain. Indeed, the average price
pop is about 18% whereas the average takeover premium is about 50%.
There is no obvious reason why the sell-side premium in an IPO should be
lower than the buy-side premium in a takeover-why the cost of entering
the market should be less than the cost of exiting the market. Arguably,
investment bankers do a pretty good job keeping down the price of going
public.
Finally, what about the apparent relationship of price pop to total
market capitalization? At first blush, it seems quite mysterious that there
would be any such relationship at all. How does the market know? Why
does it care? Again, the answer may relate to investor diversification.
Many institutional investors weigh portfolios holdings according to the
market capitalization of the issuer. It thus stands to reason that demand for
a stock will be directly related to its market capitalization.6 6
64 Moreover, the bidder in a tender offer must expect significant gains to overcome the
disadvantage of being undiversified (or the implicit premium that diversified investors
attach to portfolio stocks, which is the same thing). On the other hand, some bidders
such as LBO firms may be somewhat diversified. It is possible that most DAOs involve
companies that need money.
65 A similar phenomenon occurs when a stock that is already publicly traded is
added to a major index such as the S&P500. Because major market indices are
used by index funds (among others) as a model for their portfolios, addition to an
index enhances demand for a stock and thus its price.
66 It is not entirely clear that this approach to weighting makes sense. It might make
more sense to weight according to public float. Some market indices and funds have
adopted such a method recently. Indeed, some indices such as the Dow Jones Averages
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is not at all clear from the data that the first day price increase
seen in most initial public offerings is a result of underpricing. Rather, it is
possible-if not likely-that the first day price increase is natural market
phenomenon akin to a takeover premium. In addition, it may be that the
price increase is the natural result of the incorporation of a new issue into
the portfolios of diversified investors. Because diversified investors assume
less risk than undiversified investors, they are willing to pay a higher price
for each individual stock as part of a portfolio of numerous stocks.
Moreover, because the market understands the value of diversification, they
are willing to buy newly issued stock even though the offering may be
motivated by the desire of insiders to cash out and themselves gain the
advantages of diversification. But because the market understands that
insiders stand to gain, issuers must effectively pay a premium by offering
the stock for less than it is likely to be worth in the hands of diversified
investors. As a result, pop goes the market.
do not weight stocks at all. But no matter how one measures market capitalization,
weighting implies that the more a stock is worth the more of it the market will demand.
This gives rise to positive feedback that magnifies changes in stock price in either
direction. Indeed, one study during the dotcom frenzy found a strong logarithmic
correlation between market capitalization and market prices for internet stocks.
Presumably the same relationship would hold for any stock.
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IV. APPENDICES
OCTOBER 1999 STUDY -- USE OF PROCEEDS
Statements relating to use of proceeds are from the IPO Reporter or the prospectus
as indicated.
AETHER SYSTEMS
Prospectus: We intend to use approximately $14.8 million of net proceeds to repay
in full all indebtedness incurred under our senior secured interim credit facility with
Merrill Lynch & Co., one of the underwriters of this offering, of which $11.7
million was used to purchase Mobeo, approximately $0.8 million was used to pay
fees and expenses related to the credit facility and the remaining $2.3 million was
allocated for general corporate purposes. In addition, we intend to use
approximately $2.5 million of the net proceeds to exercise a warrant to increase our
ownership in OpenSky from 26% to up to 33% on a fully diluted basis and
approximately $2.0 million to expand our network operations center over the next
12 months. We currently intend to use the remaining net proceeds from the offering
for general corporate purposes, which may include some or all of the following:
enhance our sales and marketing activities; fund cash flow deficits and working
capital needs; enhance Mobeo service offerings; fund potential future acquisitions;
and maintain our interest in OpenSky.
ALTIGEN COMMUNICATIONS
Prospectus: General corporate purposes, including working capital.
BREAKAWAY SOLUTIONS
IPOR: To increase its visibility and strengthen its reputation in the marketplace; to
enhance its ability to use stock for acquisitions; and to provide liquidity for the
company's existing stockholders.
CALICO COMMERCE
IPOR: Primarily for general corporate purposes, including sales and marketing
activities, product development and support and capital expenditures; $3 million of
the proceeds is earmarked for facilities improvements or acquisitions.
CHARLOTTE RUSSE HOLDING
Prospectus: We intend to use all of the net proceeds to repay substantially all of our
secured indebtedness outstanding under our revolving credit facility.
CROSSROADS SYSTEMS
Prospectus: Working capital and other general corporate purposes, as well as
capital expenditures, expansion of our marketing and distribution activities,
research and product development, and potential acquisitions.
CYSIVE
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IPOR: Obtain additional equity capital, create a public market for its common stock
and facilitate future access to public markets; general corporate purposes, including
working capital, expansion of operations and sales and marketing activities.
DSL.NET
Prospectus: To continue building our network and for working capital and other
general corporate purposes. We may also use a portion of the proceeds to acquire
complementary businesses.
E-STAMP
IPOR: Sales and marketing expenditures related to promoting the company's
services; building the E-Stamp brand; and developing additional strategic
relationships.
HOMESERVICES.COM
Prospectus: for (1) the continued development of its E-commerce operations, (2)
working capital and (3) general corporate purposes, which include acquisitions of
real estate brokerage firms and their related service businesses.
IGO
IPOR: Obtain additional capital, create a public market for the company's common
stock and facilitate further access to public markets. iGo intends to use
approximately half of the net proceeds for investment in sales and marketing, and
the remainder for general corporate purposes, including working capital and capital
expenditures, as well as possible strategic acquisitions or investments.
ILLUMINET HOLDINGS
Prospectus: to fund potential acquisitions; to develop new and improved services;
to maintain and expand our network equipment and infrastructure; and for general
corporate purposes.
INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES
Prospectus: General corporate purposes, including working capital.
INTERWOVEN
IPOR: Working capital and other general corporate purposes, including increased
sales and marketing expenditures, increased research and development
expenditures and capital expenditures.
JNI
Prospectus: repayment of indebtedness of approximately $4.3 million to Jaycor,
Inc., an affiliate; and working capital and general corporate purposes, including
product development, sales and marketing and potential acquisitions of products,
technologies or companies.
JUPITER COMMUNICATIONS
IPOR: Working capital.
MARTHA STEWART LIVING OMNIMEDIA
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Prospectus: We may use approximately $41.8 million of the net proceeds from this
offering to purchase shares of Class A common stock held by Time Publishing
Ventures, Inc., a subsidiary of Time Inc., under the terms of an existing agreement.
We plan to use the remainder of the net proceeds of this offering for general
corporate purposes.
NAVISITE
Prospectus: For enhancement and expansion of our network infrastructure,
expansion of sales and marketing efforts, enhancement of application management
and technical expertise, possible acquisitions of complimentary businesses and
technologies and working capital and general corporate purposes.
NETCENTIVES
IPOR: Working capital and other general corporate purposes.
NEUBERGER BERMAN
IPOR: Repay a $50 million subordinated note; and repay approximately $42
million of short-term borrowings
PC TEL
Prospectus: $15.7 million of the proceeds from this offering will be used to repay
bank debt. The remaining proceeds will be used for general corporate purposes,
including working capital, and for potential investments in and acquisitions of
complementary products, technologies or businesses.
PLANETRX.COM
IPOR: For general corporate purposes, principally working capital and capital
expenditures.
QUICKLOGIC
IPOR: General corporate purposes ($20.9 mil.), additional proceeds will be used to
make payments stemming from a legal dispute with Actel, as well as fund future
acqusitions.
RADIO UNICA COMMUNICATIONS CORP
Prospectus: to prepay all indebtedness outstanding under our credit facility;for
acquisitions and upgrades; for general corporate purposes and working capital
requirements.
RESOURCEPHOENIX.COM
IPOR: Capital expenditures and general corporate purposes.
SILICON IMAGE
IPOR: Working capital and debt repayment.
SMARTDISK
IPOR: Research and development ($6.1 mil.), sales and marketing ($3.0) and
capital expenditures (3.0 mil.).
SYCAMORE NETWORKS
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Prospectus: for general corporate purposes, including working capital and capital
expenditures, and the repayment of certain indebtedness.
TRIZETTO GROUP
IPOR: Expansion of sales and marketing activities; development of application
services, Internet and connectivity technologies.
VIADOR
Prospectus: for general corporate purposes,including working capital, funding
operating losses and approximately $7.0 million to $10.0 million for research and
development in connection with our operations.
VITAMINSHOPPE.COM
IPOR: Net proceeds will be used for Web site improvement ($7.5 mil.) and debt
repayment ($5.8 mil.)
WILLIAMS COMMUNICATIONS GROUP
Prospectus: We estimate that the net proceeds from the equity offering will be
approximately $635.7 million. We estimate that the net proceeds from the notes
offering will be approximately $1.94 billion and the net proceeds from the
concurrent investments will be at least $725 million. We intend to use these net
proceeds, together with other borrowings and available funds, to develop and light
the Williams network, repay portions of our debt, fund operating losses and for
working capital and general corporate purposes
WOMEN.COM NETWORKS
Prospectus: To fund continued growth and expansion of our business, to build our
brand both online and offline and to enhance our products. The balance of the
proceeds will be used to fund potential acquisitions and for other general corporate
purposes, including working capital.
WORLD WRESTLING FEDERATION ENTERTAINMENT
Prospectus: We intend to use the net proceeds of approximately $155.6 million
from the offering for working capital and other general corporate purposes.
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VITAMINSHOPPE.COM VSHP TWIP 8-Oct 11 9.75 88.64% -11.36%
RESOURCEPHOENIX.COM RPCX IRS 14-Oct 8 7.38 92.25% -7.75%
NEUBERGER BERMAN NEU GS 6-Oct 32 31.5 98.44% -1.56%
TRIZETTO GROUP TZIX BS 7-Oct 9 9 100.00% 0.00%
HOMESERVICES.COM HMSV USB/PJ 8-Oct 15 15 100.00% 0.00%
NETOENTIVES NCNT OSEIB 14-Oct 12 12.56 104.67% 4.67%
CHARLOTTE RUSSE HOLDINGS CHIC IRS 20-Oct 11 11.88 108.00% 8.00%
DSL.NET DSLN DBAB 6-Oct 7.5 8.53 113.73% 13.73%
GO IGOC IRS 14-Oct 12 14.06 117.17% 17.17%
WILLIAMS COMMUNICATIONS WCG SSB 1 -Oct 23 28.06 122.00% 22.00%
VIADOR VIAD BS 25-Oct 9 11.13 123.67% 23.67%
E STAMP ESTM DLJ 8-Oct 17 22.38 131.65% 31.65%
PCTEL PCTI BOAS 18-Oct 17 23.5 138.24% 38.24%
WORLD WRESTLING FEDERATION XMNFE BS 18-Oct 17 25.25 148.53% 48.53%
ILLUMINET HOLDINGS ILUM MSDW 7-Oct 19 28.5 150.00% 50.00%
QUICKLOGIC QUIK IRS 15-Oct 10 15.13 151.30% 51.30%
RADIO UNICA COMMUNICATIONS UNCA SSB 18-Oct 16 27.44 171.50% 71.50%
PLANETRX.COM PLRX GS 6-Oct 16 26 162.50% 62.50%
ALTIGEN COMMUNICATIONS ATGN CIBC 5-Oct 10 16.63 166.30% 66.30%
JUPITER COMMUNICATIONS JPTR DLJ 8-Oct 21 35.5 169.05% 69.05%
WOMEN.COM WOMN MSDW 14-Oct 10 18.5 185.00% 85.00%
MARTHA STEWART LIVING MSO MSDW 19-Oct 18 35.56 197.56% 97.56%
SMARTDISK SMDK IRS 6-Oct 13 25.81 198.54% 98.54%
JNI JNIC DLJ 26-Oct 19 42 221.05% 121.05%
CYSIVE CYSV TWIP 14-Oct 17 37.75 222.06% 122.06%
SILICON IMAGE SIMG OSEIB 5-Oct 12 26.75 222.92% 122.92%
INTERWOVEN IWOV CSFIB 7-Oct 17 41 241.18% 141.18%
NAVISITE NAVI IRS 22-Oct 14 34.63 247.36% 147.36%
BREAKAWAY SOLUTIONS BWAY MSDW 5-Oct 14 42.25 301.79% 201.79%
INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES ITRU OSEIB 26-Oct 18 54.38 302.11% 202.11%
AETHER SYSTEMS AETH ML 20-Oct 16 50 312.50% 212.50%
CALICO COMMERCE CLIC GS/ML 6-Oct 14 56 400.00% 300.00%
CROSSROADS SYSTEMS CRDS COWEN 19-Oct 18 78.72 437.33% 337.33%
SYCAMORE NETWORKS SCMR MSDW 21 -Oct 38 184.75 486.18% 386.18%
AVERAGES 92.15%
STANDARD DEVIATION 100.55%
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